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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
SCHROEDER INVESTMENTS, L.C. 
Plaintiff / Appellant, 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, 
Defendant / Appellee, 
CLYDE C. EDWARDS, LINDA K. 
EDWARDS, and DOES 1 through 10, 
Defendants. 
CaseNo.2011910-SC 
I 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT / APPELLEE UDOT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This action comes within the original jurisdiction of this Court under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)0 (West 2009). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Schroeder Investments, L.C. (Schroeder) sought to condemn part of a parcel of 
real property owned by Utah's Department of Transportation (UDOT). Schroeder sought 
to condemn this property to widen an existing right-of-way for use as a public road or 
byroad. Can a private entity condemn land for use as a public road or byroad? 
ISSUE PRESERVED BELOW: This issue was raised in the UDOT's motion to 
dismiss (R. 177-203, 223-26) that was denied by the district court. R. 353-58. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW: The district court's ruling on a motion to dismiss is 
reviewed for correctness. Cook v. City ofMoront 2005 UT App 40,15, 107 P.3d 713. 
See also Russell Packard Dev.. Inc. v. Carson. 2005 UT 14, % 108 P.3d 741 ("When 
reviewing the propriety of a motion to dismiss, we accept the factual allegations in the 
complaint as true and interpret those facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom 
in a light most favorable to the plaintiff as the nonmoving party."). 
2. Except for a preexisting right-of-way, UDOT planned to use the entirety of the 
parcel to build a detention basin as part of the I-15 CORE Project (project). Did the 
district court err when it held that UDOT's highway project was a more necessary public 
use? 
• ) 
ISSUE PRESERVED BELOW: This issue was raised in the UDOT's motion for 
summary judgment (R. 317-52, 386-90) that was granted by the district court. R. 627-35. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: A grant of summary judgment is reviewed for 
correctness, giving no deference to the district court's decision. Summary judgment is 
appropriate only if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Franco v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Dav 
Saints, 2001 UT 25, f32, 21 P.3d 198. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
All such provisions are set forth verbatim in Addendum A to this brief. 
2 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On November 30, 2009, Schroederinvestments, L.C. (Schrdeder) filed this action 
against Clyde and Linda Edwards
 v K 
Edwards' property to enlarge an existing right-of-way for the purpose of creation of a 
public byroad. R. 5 at %IS. On September 24,2Q1Q, Schroeder filed its first amended 
complaint (R. 150-59) with permiss^ 
complaint added UDOT as a defendant because UDOT had purchased part of the 
Edwards'property. R. 157. Schroeder alleged that it would dedicate the condemned 
property as a public right of way. R. 155 at If 17.
 ; .. . 
UDOT moved to dismiss this action on the grounds that Schroeder, as a private 
party, could not condemn land for a public road or byroad. R. 177-203, 223-26. The 
motion was denied on February 11, 201L R, 353-58. 
UDOT also filed a motion for summary judgment. R. 317-52,386-90. This 
motion argued that UDOT's use of the property was a more necessary public use. On 
September 15, 2011, the district court granted UDOT's motion. R. 627-35. The court 
also certified its decision as a final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. R. 630. ^ 
Schroeder filed its notice of appeal on Qctober 12, 2011. R. 669-71. 
3 
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STATEMENTOF 
Schroeder Investments, L.C. (Schroeder) owns property to the west of Interstate 15 
(1-15) in Provo, Utah. The parcel is currently vacant, though Schroeder desires to develop 
a selkstorage unit on the property. R. 6v Clyde and Linda Edwards and UDOT own a 
parcel of property to the north of Schf oeder's property. 
Schroeder owns an easement for a 1614 foot wide right-of-way along the eastern 
edge of that property. R. 13. This easement provides access to Schroeder's property from 
the north. Schroeder alleged that Provo City required a right-of-way at least 24 feet wide 
"in order to be of sufficient width to allow development on the Schroeder parcel." R. 6. 
Schroeder sought to widen the existing right-of-way by 9/4 feet to allow for the 
construction of a road so it could develop its property. 
UDOT sought to purchase a portion of the Edwards' property (parcel 913) and part 
of Schroeder's property (parcel 826:A) for the construction of the 1-15 CORE Project. 
Parcel 913 was to be used for a detention basin. R. 324-25. Prior to the initiation of this 
condemnation action, Steve Schroeder requested a meeting with UDOT officials 
regarding the project. That meeting occurred on May 11, 2009, at which Mr. Schroeder 
voiced his desire to obtain a widened right-of-way easement across parcel 913. R. 321/ 
UDOT responded that parcel 913fs planned mnoffcletention pond would have to be 
redesigned to accommodate Schroeder's desired access, but that "it was a possibility but 
not a guaranty that UDOT would be able to do this." Id. The meeting ended with the 
4 
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expectation that Mr. Schroeder would contact UDOT after obtaining more information 
from Provo City. Id. 
From June 5, 2009, to August 19,2009, UDOT repeatedly attempted to contact 
Mr. Schroeder hut did not receive a response, R, 320. Mr, Schroeder finally contacted 
UDOT on August 27,2009, and was presented with an offer on Septem^ 
UDOT to purchase J4 acre of parcel 826: A in order to accommodate a redesigned 
detention pond. Mr. Schroeder was "not really happy" and stated he would "get back" to 
UDOT about the offer. R. 319. Further attempts by UDOT to communicate with Mr. 
Schroeder were unsuccessful. On November 13, 2009 Eric Lyon, Right-of-Way Manager 
for the project, authorized condemnation because Mr. Schroeder "will not communicate." 
R. 318. Attempts to negotiate with Mr. Schroeder regarding an easement across parcel 
913 "were unsuccessful because of Mr. Schroederfs refusal to return communications." 
R.325. 
Because the negotiations had been unsuccessful, UDOT instructed its contractor to 
go ahead with designing and building the detention basin solely on parcel 913. Eric Lyon 
testified by affidavit that "[a]ny redesign of the detention basin at this time, would cost 
UDOT additional money and possible delay construction costs." R. 324-25. 
In April, 2009, UDOT began negotiating with the Edwards to purchase that part of 
their property described as parcel 913. On October 14, 2009, the Edwards signed a 
5 
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contract selling parcel 913 to UDOT. On December 10, 2009 the sale of parcel 913 to 
UDOT was finalized. R. 633. 
Throughout its opening brief^ Schroeder cites to the comments of counsel for 
UDOT at an August 15, 2011 hearing before the district court. R. 687. UDOT's counsel 
stated, in part, that there was plenty 6f time and it Would not cost UDOT aiiy more money 
to permit Schroeder the e n l ^ 30, These 
statements are taken out of context, The full statement was that 
Mr. Mansfield is correct. There is plenty of time. I shouldn't say 
plenty of time, but there is a window of time here that this could shoehorn 
in. Provo River Contractors is anxious to get forward and they've said 
we'll work with Schroeder. Schroeder is willing to augment the use by 
adding some additional property, and so that won't cost, it won't delay, we 
can accomplish this. Yes, we can accomplish it, but is it harmonious with 
the present use? It is not. It is only rendered harmonious by the addition of 
this extra property. 
There's this other speculation issue, and let me emphasize I consider 
the addition of this extra property to be speculative, but there is this broader 
issue of the 404 permit issued by the US Army Corps of Engineers under 
the Clean Water Act that UDOT and the Provo River Contractors are bounds 
to as it presently exists. There is a question can this be done, this additional 
property be added without violating that 404 permit. We don't know. 
Because we do not know that, this Court should be - should tread 
very carefully in ordering UDOT to make some changes that have not been 
previously approved by the Uhited States Government in the 404 permit. 
We're speculating. We're speculating on the addition of this extra property. 
We're speculating on the wetland clearance, and bottom line, we're 
speculating on what Provo City will do. 
R. 687 at 30-31 (Provo River Contractors is UDOT's contractor for the project). 
6 
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Portions of the final environmental impact statement for the project were provided 
to the district court. R. 327-42. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Schroeder seeks to condemn property owned by the State of Utah to create a public 
road or byroad. Such a road would be owned by Provo City. Provo has not sought to 
condemn property for such a road. While Utah law permits private entities to condemn 
certain property for public uses such as mining, irrigation, and telegraph lines, it should 
not be extended to the creation of public roads. Such roads are created and vacated by the 
appropriate government entity. 
UDOT's detention basin would use all of parcel 901 except for the preexisting 
right-of-way. There is no remaining property that could be used by Schroeder. The 
enlargement of the right-of-way would require UDOT to obtain other property to 
construct its detention basin. The district court held that the compatible use doctrine did 
not apply because Schroeder sought to dispossess UDOT. UDOT could not use of its 
property for a detention basin if it was to be used as a public road or byroad. These uses 
are not compatible uses. A public road or byroad is not a compatible use with a detention 
basin. 
7 
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ARGUMENT 
! SCHROEDER CANNOT CONDEMN PROPERTY FOR THE 
CREATION OR ENLARGEMENT OF A PUBLIC ROAD 
Eminent domain is an inherent power of a sovereign. Kohl v. United States. 91 
U.S. 367, 371 (1875) (a state's power of eminent domain is inseparable from its 
sovereignty). In Utah, "the State unquestionably has the right to take or damage private 
property when necessary for public use." State Road Comm'n v. Dist Court. 78 P.2d 
502, 505 (Utah 1937). The state legislature has.seen proper to delegate this authority to 
certain government and quasi government entities. This delegation has been strictly 
limited to the exercise within those statutory delegations. 
In CP Nat'l Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n. 638 P.2d 519, 523 (Utah 1981) this 
Court held that cities, without express statutory authority, could not condemn an electrical 
power system. See also Provo City v. Ivie. 2004 UT 30,1J18, 94 P.3d 206 (without an 
express statutory grant of authority city could not condemn property outside its borders); 
Great Salt Lake Auth. v. Island Ranching Co., 421 P.2d 504, 505 (Utah 1966) (without 
express statutory authorization, authority did not have power of eminent domain); 
Bertagnoliv.Baker.215 P.2d 626, 627-27 (Utah 1950) (without statutory authority, 
school district did not have power to condemn land outside the school district's 
boundaries). These cases illustrate that this Court has been strict in its interpretation of 
legislative delegation of the power of eminent domain. 
8 
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There is no express delegation to private entities of the power to condemn land to 
be used as public roads or byroads. Utah Code Ann. §78B-6-501(West 2009)l states that 
roads, streets, alleys, and byroads are public uses. But it doesn't identify which public 
uses authorize private entities to use eminent domain. To claim that all of the authorized 
uses of eminent domain are available to private citizens would be unworkable. This 
would permit private entities to condemn land to be used as public buildings for the state, 
counties, cities, towns, or boards of education. § 78B-6-501(2) & (3). It would also 
allow private entities to condemn land for "all public purposes authorized by the 
Government of the United States." Id. at (1). 
The Utah Legislature gave Provo the authority "to lay out, establish, open, alter, 
widen, narrow, extend, grade, pave, or otherwise improve streets, alleys, avenues, 
boulevards" and to vacate the same or parts thereof. Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-8 (West 
Supp. 2011). There is no statute sharing this authority with private entities. Indeed, by 
permitting private entities to create public road 
would be faced with the creation of roads that they did not desire and that may* or may 
not, meet the design and construction requirements for such roadways. 
1
 This is the version of the statute that was in effect at the time Schroeder filed this 
action. The statute has since been amended twice. The parties' substantive rights are 
determined by the law in place when the Cause of action arose. State Indus. Cbmm'n, 725 
P.2d 1335, 1336 (Utah 1986). 
9 
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Further, Section 501 did not authorize the use of eminent domain for byroads to 
developments at the time Schroeder brought this action. In 2009, the statute stated that 
eminent domain could be used for ^ byroads leading from highways to 
farms/' Id. at (7). In 2010, the legislature amended this provision to permit eminent 
domain for the construction of "byroads leading from a highway to ah existing or 
proposed: (a) residence; (b) development; or (c) farm." 2010 Laws of Utah, c. 401 §1. 
The statute does not expressly State who can use eminent domain in these particular 
circumstances. 
The primary goal of courts in interpreting a statute is to give effect to the 
legislature's intent as evidenced by the plain language of the statute. State v. Bums, 2000 
UT 56,1f25,4 P.3d 795 ("We need look beyond the plain language only if we find some 
ambiguity.")- But the language of section 501 is ambiguous. It does not clearly identify 
what uses of eminent domain are available to private entities and which are only available 
to government. Indeed, the cases cited above show that there are other restrictions found 
on the use of eminent domain that are not found in this statute. 
The legislative history of the 2010 amendment to Sectiori 501 cm properly be used 
to determine the legislative intent. In re Adoption of Baby E.Z., 2011 UT 38, ^15, 266 
P.3d 702 (if a statute is found to be ambiguous, legislative history and public policy can 
be used to glean the statute's intent). In considering the 2010 amendments to Section 
501, the House Transportation Committee was expressly informed that the intent was that 
10 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
only government could use this new eminent domain power. That no one in the private 
sector could use it. R. 188-89. 
This amendment was effective from May 11, 2010 to May 9, 201L Effective May 
10, 2011, the legislature amended this statute to only apply to -'byroads leading from a 
highway to: (a) a residence; (b) a development; or (c) a farm." 2011 Laws of Utah, c. 82 
§1. . : /•' 
At the time this action was filed no entity, public or private, could use eminent 
domain powers to condemn property for a byroad leading to a development. Since May 
10, 2011 eminent domain can only be used to create a byroad leading to a development, 
not a proposed development. 
Even if private entities had the right to use eminent domain to create public roads, 
the statute did not authorize such a use at the time Schroeder filed this action. The district 
court erred when it held that Schroeder could condemn UDOT's property to create a 
public byroad. That decision should be reversed and the dismissal of this action affirmed 
on this alternative ground. 
II. UDOT'S 1-15 CORE PROJECT WAS THE MORE NECESSARY 
PUBLIC USE 
Utah's Legislature set certain conditions precedent to the use of eminent domain. 
(l)Before property can be taken it must appear that: 
(a) the use to which it is to be applied is a use authorized by law; 
(b) the taking is necessary for the use; 
11 
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(c) construction and use of all property sought to be condemned will 
commence within a reasonable time as determined by the court, after the 
initiation of proceedings under this part; and 
(d) if already appropriated to some public use, the public use to which it is 
to be applied is a more necessary public use. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-504(l) (West 2009). 
The district court held that UDOT's was the more necessary public use. R. 630-
32. Throughout its opening brief, Schroeder argues that the district court erred because 
the "compatible use •> doctrine is an exception to the more tiecessafy public Use 
requirement. Opening Brief of Plaintiff at 8. 
"Under the statutes of eminent domain the law seems to be well settled that, where 
two public uses can stand together without material impairment or impediment of one by 
the other, they must so stand.55 Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City Water & Elec. Power Co., 
67 P. 672, 677 (Utah 1902). But UDOT's use of its property for a detention basin cannot 
stand with Schroeder5s efforts to use the same land to enlarge its right-of-way. The 
undisputed facts found by the district court showed that UDOT would need to acquire 
additional property to build the necessary detention basin. The property remaining after 
Schroeder5s condemnation would be inadequate. R. 632. 
The compatible use doctrine presupposes that two different public uses can jointly 
occupy a parcel of land. In Montenaire Mining Co. V. Columbus Rexall Consol. Mines 
Co., 174 P. 172 (Utah 1918), this Court held that two m 
tunnel where the tunnel was not being used to full capacity by the original owners. 
12 
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What appellant seeks is not to appropriate respondent's tunnel and to 
dispossess the latter of its property rights therein or of its use, but what 
appellant seeks is to condemn the right to use the tunnel in common with 
the respondent; that is, to condemn the unused capacity of the tunnel. 
Where property is condemned for a more necessary use, the original 
condemner is deprived of his ownership and use. Such is not the case* 
however, where a second right to use the property or right of way is one in 
common with the present owner thereof. This distinction must be clearly 
kept in mind, and, if it is, no confusion can arise. In condemning the right 
to a joint use or a use in common, all that the condemner gets, or can get, is 
the right to use that which the present possessor or owner does not or cannot 
use. 
Id at 176. 
Schroeder's proposed use of UDOT's property would not be a compatible use. It 
would take property UDOT needs to build its detention basin. UDOPplans to use all of, 
the property in question for the 1-15 CORE Project. The district court correctly held that 
the compatible use doctrine did not apply. 
3. The Court finds that Utah has accepted the compatible use 
doctrine as announced in the case Montenaire Mining Co. V. Columbus 
Rexall Consol. Mines Co. et aL 174 P. 172 (Utah 1918). In Montaire. both 
condemnor and condemnee desired similar use o f a mining tunnel. The 
Court allowed condemnation of extra capacity of the tunnel to be 
condemned, thus placing the tunnel in joint use. The Court stated this was 
to be allowed so long as the use in common is practicable and the prior use 
is not dispossessed or deprived. In the proposed Schroeder use, there is no 
unused capacity to be condemned. In order to continue UDOT's use the 
detention pond must be relocated on other property UDOT does not 
presently own. While it may be feasible, Schroeder's proposal is not 
compatible with the intended and designed UDOT use. 
As such, the Schroeder condemnation does not fall within the 
compatible use doctrine as adopted by the Utah court. This Court fi 
legal conclusion the proposed Schroeder public use is not compatible with 
13 
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the greater necessary UDOT public use because UDOT'S use is of full 
capacity of the land and there is nothing left to condemn. 
R.631. 
The district court's conclusions show that it did not believe that the compatible 
uses needed to be the same or similar as argued by Schroeder. Opening Brief of Plaintiff 
at 19-20. The district court's holding is not based on a difference in the two uses. It was 
based on the fact that UDOT was using the full capacity of its land. 
Schroeder has not challenged the district court's conclusion that UDOT's public 
use is the more necessary. R. 633. Instead Schroeder seeks to extend the compatible use 
doctrine to require a landowner to surrender property that it is using futly for a promise 
that alternate property will be made available. UDOT sought to negotiate with Schroeder. 
It was only after months of failed efforts to communicate with Steve Schroeder that 
UDOT determined to proceed with its original plans in November, 2009. 
Schroeder's offer of additional land called for speculation. Even if the parties 
could now agree on what property should be given to UDOT, it remains unclear whether 
the federal government's permits under the Clean Water Act would allow the use of 
different land. It is unknown whether the detention basin could be built, in part, on a 
different site. 
There was no unused capacity that could be condemned for Schroeder's use. The 
district court correctly dismissed this action and that decision should be affirmed on 
appeal. 
14 
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CONCLUSION 
The district court erred when it held that Schroeder could condemn UDOT's 
property to create a public byroad. That decision should be reversed and the dismissal of 
this action affirmed on this alternative ground. In the alternative, the district court's 
holding that UDOT's 1-15 CORE Project was the more necessary public use should be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this /3 day of July, 2012. 
BRENT A. BURNETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendant / Appellee UDOT 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-501 (West 2009)- Eminent domain—Uses for which right 
may be exercised 
Subject to the provisions of this part, the right of eminent domain may be exercised on 
behalf of the following public uses: 
(1) all public uses authorized by the Government of the United States; 
(2) public buildings and grounds for the use of the state, and all other public uses 
authorized by the Legislature; 
(3)(a) public buildings and grounds for the use of any county, city, town, or board of 
education; 
(b) reservoirs, canals, aqueducts, flumes, ditches, or pipes for conducting water for the 
use of the inhabitants of any county^ city, or town, or for the draining of any county, city, 
or town; 
(c) the raising of the banks of streams, removing obstructions from streams, and 
widening, deepening, or straightening their channels; 
(d) bicycle paths and sidewalks adjacent to paved roads; * 
(e) roads, streets, and alleys for public vehicular use, excluding trails, paths, or other ways 
for walking, hiking, bicycling, equestrian use, or other recreational uses, or whose 
pritiiaty purpose is as a foot path, equestrian trail, bicycle path, or walkway; and 
(f) all other public uses for the benefit of any county, city, or town, or its inhabitants; 
(4) wharves, docks, piers, chutes, booms, ferries, bridges, toll roads, byroads, plank and 
turnpike roads, roads for transportation by traction engines or road locomotives, roads for 
logging or lumbering purposes, and railroads and street railways for public transportation; 
(5) reservoirs, dams, watergates, canals, ditches, flumes, tunnels, aqueducts and pipes for 
the supplying of persons, mines, mills, smelters or other works for the reduction of ores, 
with water for domestic or other uses, or for irrigation purposes, or for the draining and 
reclaiming of lands, or for the floating of logs and lumber on streams not navigable, or for 
solar evaporation ponds and other facilities for the recovery of minerals in solution; 
(6)(a) roads, railroads, tramways, tunnels, ditches, flumes, pipes, and dumping places to 
facilitate the milling, smelting, or other reduction of ores, or the working of mines, 
quarries, coal mines, or mineral deposits including minerals in solution; 
(b) outlets, natural or otherwise, for the deposit or conduct of tailings, refuse or water 
from mills, smelters or other works for the reduction of ores, or from mines, quarries, coal 
mines or mineral deposits including minerals in solution; 
(c) mill dams; 
(d) gas, oil or coal pipelines, tanks or reservoirs, including any subsurface stratum or 
formation in any land for the underground storage of natural gas, and in connection with 
that, any other interests in property which may be required to adequately examine, 
prepare, maintain, and operate underground natural gas storage facilities; 
(e) solar evaporation ponds and other facilities for the recovery of minerals in solution; 
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and 
(f) any occupancy in common by the owners or possessors of different mines, quarries, 
coal mines, mineral deposits, mills, smelters, or other places for the reduction of ores, or 
any place for the flow, deposit or conduct of tailings or refuse matter; 
(7) byroads leading from highways to residences and farms; 
(8) telegraph, telephone, electric light and electric power lines, and sites for electric light 
and power plants; 
(9) sewerage of any city or town, or of any settlement of not less than ten families, or of 
any public building belonging to the state, or of any college or university; 
(10) canals, reservoirs, dams, ditches, flumes, aqueducts, and pipes for supplying and 
storing water for the operation of machinery for the purpose of generating and 
transmitting electricity for power, light or heat; 
(11) cemeteries and public parks, except for a park whose primary use is: 
(a) as a trail, path, or other way for walking, hiking, bicycling, or equestrian use; or 
(b) to connect other trails, paths, or other ways for walking, hiking, bicycling, or 
equestrian use; 
(12) pipe lines for the purpose of conducting any and all liquids connected with the 
manufacture of beet sugar; and -
(13) sites for mills, smelters or other works for the reduction of ores and necessary to 
their successful operation, including the right to take lands for the discharge and natural 
distribution of smoke, fumes, and dust, produced by the operation of works, provided that 
the powers granted by this subsection may not be exercised in any county where the 
population exceeds 20,000, or within one mile of the limits of any city or incorporated 
town nor unless the proposed condemner has the right to operate by purchase, option to 
purchase or easement, at least 75% in value of land acreage owned by persons or 
corporations situated within a radius of four miles from the mill, smelter or other works 
for the reduction of ores; nor beyond the limits of the four-mile radius; nor as to lands 
covered by contracts, easements, or agreements existing between the condemner and the 
owner of land within the limit and providing for the operation of such mill, smelter, or 
other works for the reduction of ores; nor until an action shall have been commenced to 
restrain the operation of such mill, smelter, or other works for the reduction of ores. 
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Enrolled Copy S.B. 122 
1 EMINENT DOMAIN REVISIONS 
2 2010 GENERAL SESSION 
3 STATE OF UTAH 
4 Chief Sponsor: J. Stuart Adams 
5 House Sponsor: Michael T. Morley 
' 6 .- - ; - ' 
7 LONG TITLE 
8 General Description: 
9 This bill amends provisions relating to the right to exercise eminent domain. 
10 Highlighted Provisions: * 
11 This bill: 
12 • authorizes an entity to exercise eminent domain for: 
13 • a byroad leading from a highway to an existing or proposed residence, 
14 development, or farm; or 
15 • sewage service for an existing or proposed development; and 
16 • makes technical corrections. 
17 Monies Appropriated in this Bill: 
18 None 
19 Other Special Clauses: 
20 None 
21 Utah Code Sections Affected: 
22 AMENDS: 
23 78B-6-501, as last amended by Laws of Utah 2008, Chiapter 341 and renumbered and 
24 amended by Laws of Utah 2008, Chapter 3 
25 -
26 Beit enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah: 
27 Section 1. Section 78B-6-501 is amended to read: 
28 78B-6-501. Eminent domain - Uses for which right may be exercised, 
29 Subject to the provisions of this part, the right of eminent domain may be exercised on 
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30 behalf of the following public uses: 
31 (1) all public uses authorized by the [Government of the United States] federal 
32 government: 
33 (2) public buildings and grounds for the use of the state, and all other public uses 
34 authorized by the Legislature; 
35 (3) (a) public buildings and grounds for the use of any county, city, town, or board of 
36 education; 
37 (b) reservoirs, canals, aqueducts, flumes, ditches, or pipes for conducting water for the 
38 use of the inhabitants of any county, city, or town, or for the draining of any county, city, or 
39 town; 
40 (c) the raising of the banks of streams, removing obstructions from streams, and 
41 widening, deepening, or straightening their channels; 
42 (d) bicycle paths and sidewalks adjacent to paved roads; 
43 (e) roads, streets, and alleys for public vehicular use, excluding trails, paths, or other 
44 ways for walking, hiking, bicycling, equestrian use, or other recreational uses, or whose 
45 primary purpose is as a foot path, equestrian trail, bicycle path, or walkway; and 
46 (f) all other public uses for the benefit of any county, city, or town, or its inhabitants; 
47 (4) wharves, docks, piers, chutes, booms, femes, bridges, toll roads, byroads, plank 
48 and turnpike roads, roads for transportation by traction engines or road locomotives, roads for 
49 logging or lumbering purposes, and railroads and street railways for public transportation; 
50 (5) reservoirs, dams, watergates, canals, ditches, flumes, tunnels, aqueducts and pipes 
51 for the supplying of persons, mines, mills, smelters or other works for the reduction of ores, 
52 with water for domestic or other uses, or for irrigation purposes, or for the draining and 
53 reclaiming of lands, or for the floating of logs and lumber on streams not navigable, or for solar 
54 evaporation ponds and other facilities for the recovery of minerals in solution; 
55 (6) (a) roads, railroads, tramways, tunnels* ditches, flumes, pipes, and dumping places 
56 to access or facilitate the milling, smelting, or other reduction of ores, or the working of mines, 
57 quarries, coal mines, or mineral deposits including minerals in solution; 
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58 (b) outlets, natural or otherwise, for the deposit or conduct of tailings, refuse or water 
59 from mills, smelters or other works for the reduction of ores, or from mines, quarries, coal 
60 mines or mineral deposits including minerals in so lu te 
61 (c) mill dams; 
62 (d) gas, oil or coal pipelines, tanks or reservoirs, including any subsurface stratum or 
63 formation in any land for the underground storage of natural gas, and in connection with that* 
64 any other interests in property which may be required to adequately examine, prepare, 
65 maintain, and operate underground natural gas storage facilities; 
66 (e) solar evaporation ponds and other facilities for the recovery of minerals in solution;, 
67 and 
68 (f) any occupancy in common by the owners or possessors of different mines, quarries, 
69 coal mines, mineral deposits, mills, smelters, or other places for the reduction of ores, or any 
70 place for the flow, deposit or conduct of tailings or refuse matter; 
71 (7) byroads leading from ["highways! a highway to [residences and farms:! an existing 
72 or proposed: 
73 (a) residence; 
74 (b) development; or ' 
75 (c) farm; 
76 (8) telegraph, telephone, electric light and electric power lines, and sites 
77 light and power plants; 
78 (9) [sewerage of any] sewage service for: 
79 (a) a city [or]a town, or [of] any settlement of not less than 10 families[, or of any]: 
80 (b) an existing or proposed development: 
81 (c) a public building belonging to the stated or of ariyl; or 
82 (d) a college or university; 
83 (10) canals, reservoirs, dams, ditches, flumes, aqueducts, and pipes for supplying and 
84 storing water for the operation of machinery for the purpose of generating and transmitting 
85 electricity for power, light or heat; 
- T -
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86 (11) cemeteries and public parks, except for a park whose primary use is: 
87 (a) as a trail, path, of other way for walking, hiking, bicycling, or equestrian use; or 
88 (b) to connect other trails, paths, or other ways for walking, hiking, bicyclings or 
89 equestrian use; 
90 (12) pipe lines for the purpose of conducting any and all liquids connected with the 
91 manufacture of beet sugar; and 
92 (13) sites for mills, smelters or other works for the reduction of ores and necessary to 
93 their successful operation, including the right to take lands for the discharge and natural 
94 distribution of smoke, fumes, and dust, produced by the operation of works, provided that the 
95 powers granted by this subsection may not be exercised in any county where the population 
96 exceeds 20,000, or within one mile of the limits of any city or incorporated town nor unless the 
97 proposed condemner has the right to operate by purchase, option to purchase or easement, at 
98 least 75% in value of land acreage owned by persons or corporations situated within a radius of 
99 four miles from the mill, smelter or other works for the reduction of ores; nor beyond the limits 
100 of the four-mile radius; nor as to lands covered by contracts, easements, or agreements existing 
101 between the condemner and the owner of land within the limit and providing for the operation 
102 of such mill, smelter, or other works for the reduction of ores; nor until an action shall have 
103 been commenced to restrain the operation of such mill, smelter, or other works for the 
104 reduction of ores. 
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1 EMINENT DOMAIN ^VISIONS 
2 2011 GENERAL SESSION 
3 STATE OF UTAH 
4 Chief Sponsor: J. Stuart Adams 
5 House Sponsor: Michael T. Morley 
23 
7 LONG TITLE 
8 General Description: 
9 This bill amends provisions relating to the right to exercise eminent domain. 
10 Highlighted Provisions; ** 
11 This bill: 
12 • amends provisions authorizing an entity to exercise eminent domain for: 
13 • a byroad leading from a highway to a residence, a development, or a farm; and 
14 • sewage service for a development; and 
15 • makes technical corrections. 
16 Money Appropriated in this Bill: 
17 None 
18 Other Special Clauses: 
19 None 
20 Utah Code Sections Affected: 
21 AMENDS: 
22 78B-6-501, as last amended by Laws of Utah 2010, Chapter 401 
24 Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah: 
25 Section 1. Section 78B-6-501 is amended to read: 
26 78B-6-501. Eminent domain - Uses for which right may be exercised* 
27 Subject to the provisions of this part, the right of eminent domain may be exercised on 
28 behalf of the following public uses: 
29 (1) all public uses authorized by the federal government; 
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30 (2) public buildings and grounds for the use of the state, and all other public uses 
31 authorized by the Legislature; 
32 (3) (a) public buildings and grounds for the use of any county, city, town, or board of 
33 education; 
34 (b) reservoirs, canals, aqueducts, flumes, ditches, or pipes for conducting water for the 
35 use of the inhabitants of any county, city, or town, or for the draining of any county, city, or 
36 town; 
37 (c) the raising of the banks of streams, removing obstructions from streams, and 
38 widening, deepening, or straightening their channels; 
39 (d) bicycle paths and sidewalks adjacent to paved roads; 
40 (e) roads, streets, and alleys for public vehicular use, excluding trails, paths, or other 
41 ways for walking, hiking, bicycling, equestrian use, or other recreational uses, or whose 
42 primary purpose is as a foot path, equestrian trail, bicycle path, or walkway; and 
43 (f) all other public uses for the benefit of any county, city, or town, or its inhabitants; 
44 (4) wharves, docks, piers, chutes, booms, ferries, bridges, toll roads, byroads, plank 
45 arid turnpike roads, roads for transportation by traction engines or road locomotives, roads for 
46 logging or lumbering purposes, and railroads and street railways for public transportation; 
47 (5) reservoirs, dams, watergates, canals, ditches, flumes, tunnels, aqueducts and pipes 
48 for the supplying of persons, mines, mills, smelters or other works for the reduction of ores, 
49 with water for domestic or other uses, or for irrigation purposes, or for the draining and 
50 reclaiming of lands, or for the floating of logs and lumber on streams not navigable, or for solar 
51 evaporation ponds and other facilities for the recovery of minerals in solution; 
52 (6) (a) roads, railroads, tramways, tunnels, ditches, flumes, pipes, and dumping places 
53 to access or facilitate the milling, smelting, or other reduction of ores, or the working of mines, 
54 quarries, coal mines, or mineral deposits including minerals in solution; 
55 ... ijj)) outlets, natural or otherwise, for the deposit or conduct of tailings, refuse or water 
56 from mills, smelters or other works for the reduction of ores, or from mines, quarries, coal 
57 mines or mineral deposits including minerals in solution; 
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58 (c) mill dams; 
59 (d) gas, oil or coal pipelines, tanks or reservoirs, including any subsurface stratum or 
60 formation in any land for the underground storage of natural gas, and in connection with that, 
61 any other interests in property which may be required to adequately examine, prepare, 
62 maintain, and operate underground natural gas storage facilities; 
63 (e) solar evaporation ponds and other facilities for the recovery of minerals in solution; 
64 and 
65 (f) any occupancy in common by the owners or possessors of different mines, quarries, 
66 coal mines, mineral deposits, mills, smelters, or other places for the reduction of ores, or any 
67 place for the flow, deposit or conduct of tailings or refuse matter; 
68 (7) byroads leading from a highway to [an existing or proposed]: 
69 (a) a residence; 
70 (b) a development; or 
71 (c) a farm; 
72 (8) telegraph, telephone, electric light and electric power lines, and sites for electric 
73 light and power plants; 
74 (9) sewage service for: 
75 (a) a city, a town, or any settlement of not less than 10 families; 
76 (b) [an existing or pmpmtd] a development; 
77 (c) a public building belonging to the state; or 
78 (d) a college or university; 
79 (10) canals, reservoirs, dams, ditches, flumes, aqueducts, and pipes for supplying and 
80 storing water for the operation of machinery for the purpose of generating and transmitting 
81 electricity for power, light or heat; 
82 (11) cemeteries and public parks, except for a park whose primary use is: 
83 (a) as a trail, path, or other way for walkiiig, hiking, bicycling, or equestrian use; or 
84 (b) to connect other trails, paths, or other ways for walking, hiking, bicycling, or 
85 equestrian use; 
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86 (12) pipe lines for the purpose of conducting any and all liquids connected with the 
87 manufacture of beet sugar; and 
88 (13) sites for mills, smelters of otheir wdfks for the reduction of ores and necessary to 
89 their successful operation; including the right to take lands for the discharge and natural 
90 distribution of smoke, fumes, and dust; produced by the operation of works, provided that the 
91 powers granted by this rsubscctibnT section may iidt be exercised in any comity Where the 
92 population exceeds 20,000, or within one mile of the limits of any city or incorporated town 
93 nor unless the proposed condemner has the right to operate by purchase, option to purchase or 
94 easement, at least 75% in value of land acreage owned by persons or corporations situated 
95 within a radius of four miles from the mill, smelter or other works for the reduction of ores; nor 
96 beyond the limits of the four-mile radius; nor as to lands covered by contracts, easements, or 
97 agreements existing between the condemner and the owner of land within the limit and 
98 providing for the operation of such mill, smelter, or other works for the reduction of ores; nor 
99 until an action shall have been commenced to restrain the operation of such mill, smelter, or 
other works for the reduction of ores. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-504 (West 2009). Conditions precedent to taking. 
(1) Before property can be taken it must appear that: 
(a) the use to which it is to be applied is a use authorized by law; 
(b) the taking is necessary for the use; 
(c) construction and use of all property sought to be condemned will commence within 
a reasonable time as determined by the court, after the initiation of proceedings under this 
part; and 
(d) if already appropriated to some public use, the public use to which it is to be 
applied is a more necessary public use. 
(2) (a) As used in this section, "governing body" means: 
(i) for a county, city, or town, the legislative body of the county, city, or town; and 
(ii) for any other political subdivision of the state, the person or body with authority to 
govern the affairs of the political subdivision. 
(b) Property may not be taken by a political subdivision of the state unless the 
governing body of the political subdivision approves the taking. 
(c) Before taking a final vote to approve the filing of an eminent domain action, the 
governing body of each political subdivision intending to take property shall provide 
written notice to each owner of property to be taken of each public meeting of the 
political subdivision's governing body at which a vote on the proposed taking is expected 
to occur and allow the property owner the opportunity to be heard on the proposed taking. 
(d) The requirement under Subsection (2)(c) to provide notice to a property owner is 
satisfied by the governing body mailing the written notice to the property owner; 
(i) at the owner's address as shown on the records of the county assessor's office; and 
(ii) at least 10 business days before the public meeting. 
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